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This paper presents new evidence on the dynamics of dollarization and euroization for 
twenty-five transition countries. Estimates of the amount of foreign currency in circulation 
(FCC) in transition countries are used to develop a new comprehensive dollarization index 
(CDI) and separate indices of currency substitution (CSI) and asset substitution (ASI). When 
the CDI is compared to the traditional dollarization index (DI) that relies solely on foreign 
currency deposits as a proxy for the extent of dollarization, I find that the comprehensive 
dollarization measure provides a more complete picture of the extent of de facto dollarization 
and euroization, and that it better reflects the separate influences of currency substitution and 
asset substitution. I find that the dynamic evolution of currency substitution and asset 
substitution in transition countries is both more variable and complex than is usually believed 
to be the case.  
These new dollarization indicators enable researchers to examine the causes of the 
dollarization process and its tendency to lead to irreversibility (hysteresis). Moreover, the 
currency substitution and asset substitution indices shed light on the dynamic consequences 
of these processes for the effectiveness of monetary policy. Finally, the new estimates of FCC 
make possible the measurement of effective currency/deposit ratios that can be used to 
develop new estimates of the size and growth of underground economies in transition 
countries. 
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Dollarization is the process of substituting a foreign currency for a domestic currency 
to fulfill the essential functions of money as a medium of exchange (currency substitution) 
and/or as a store of value (asset substitution).  Dollarization is official, when a nation adopts 
de jure, the currency of a foreign nation to wholly replace its domestic currency. The foreign 
currency thus becomes the authorized transaction medium, the store of value and the unit of 
account.  When, in the absence of such sanctions, firms and individuals nevertheless 
voluntarily substitute a foreign currency for the domestic currency as a means of payment 
(currency substitution) and/or choose to hold foreign rather than domestic denominated 
monetary assets as stores of value (asset substitution), the dollarization process is described 
as unofficial, spontaneous or de facto dollarization. 
 De facto dollarization is typically the rational response of economic agents to a loss 
of confidence in the domestic currency, often resulting from episodes of inflation, currency 
devaluations and/or currency confiscations. It may also be related to the growth of 
underground or “unrecorded” economic activities since currency; particularly foreign 
currency is often the preferred medium of exchange for such transactions. De facto 
dollarization leads to a loss of seigniorage, thwarts the monetary authority from pursuing 
inflationary finance and inhibits its effectiveness in controlling exchange rates. It also lowers 
the costs of tax evasion and thereby reduces the ability of the fiscal authority to command 
real resources from the private sector. By facilitating underground activities, de facto 
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  2dollarization can also lead to a distortion in various measures of macroeconomic activity 
making the formulation of macroeconomic policy more difficult.  
However, since de facto dollarization represents a revealed preference for holding 
foreign currency as a means of reducing the risks of domestic inflation and exchange rate 
devaluations, its salutatory consequences include the efficiency gain from portfolio 
diversification, as well as reduced incentives for inflationary finance, and capital flight.  
The dollarization literature is replete with normative discussions concerning the 
wisdom of official dollarization, but has suffered from a fundamental empirical problem 
when attempting to assess positive issues concerning the causes, consequences, costs and 
benefits of currency and asset substitution. Calvo and Vegh (1992) observed that this   
“fundamental problem” was due to the fact that “there is usually no data available on foreign 
currency circulating in an economy” and hence, “the importance of currency substitution” 
was “basically unobservable”. In the absence of empirical estimates of FCC, the profession 
lacked a comprehensive measure of de facto dollarization, as well as separate empirical 
measures of currency substitution and asset substitution. This paper attempts to overcome 
these measurement issues by presenting new time series evidence on the extent to which 
residents of transition countries choose to use foreign currency denominated monetary assets 
as substitutes for domestic currency and deposits, both as a means of payment, (currency 
substitution) and as a store of value (asset substitution).
1 In particular, I develop estimates of 
the amount of foreign cash (foreign currency in circulation [FCC]) held in the form of dollars 
and euros (European legacy currencies) in transition countries.  These estimates of FCC are 
first used to develop a comprehensive dollarization index (CDI), defined as the percentage of 
the total effective broad money supply (M2+FCC) composed of foreign currency in 
circulation and foreign currency deposits (FCC+FCD). The resulting (CDI) is then compared 
  3to the traditional dollarization index (DI) defined as the percentage of the broad money 
supply (M2) composed of FCD. The traditional dollarization measure, widely employed in 
dollarization studies of the IMF, understates the magnitude of dollarization because it relies 
exclusively on foreign currency deposits (FCD) to proxy the extent to which a nation is 
dollarized without taking account of FCC holdings. 
The first section of the paper evaluates the available evidence on the total amount of 
US dollars held abroad, and concludes that roughly 50 percent of US currency was held 
abroad at the end of 2001. I then cumulate estimates of net dollar outflows to specific 
transition countries (the difference between gross outflows and inflows) to obtain the amount 
of US dollars circulating in each transition country at the end of the year 2001. I find that 
roughly 29 percent of US currency in circulation was held in the transition countries. These 
dollar holdings comprise the major component of the foreign currency in circulation (FCC) 
in FSU countries. Additionally, we employ available survey data to obtain estimates of the 
amounts of European legacy currencies
2 in circulation in several CEE countries.  Eleven of 
the transition countries are shown to have more than 50 percent of their total currency supply 
in the form of foreign currency.  
Section II employs these FCC estimates to obtain a comprehensive dollarization 
index (CDI) of the extent of de facto dollarization in each transition country and to determine 
the temporal trend of dollarization over the last five years. These CDI measures are then 
compared to the traditional IMF measures of dollarization (DI). Both measures suggest that 
levels of de facto dollarization are higher in the FSU countries than in the CEE countries. 
Both measures indicate rising dollarization trends in all the FSU countries and in some of the 
CEE countries. I also identify declining dollarization trends in some of CEE countries with 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 Earlier efforts by Feige, et al. (2002a,) and Feige and Dean (2002) reported initial unadjusted point in time 
estimates of dollarization in various countries.  
  4the lowest levels of dollarization. Across CEE countries, the correlation between the CDI and 
DI is .988, however, for the more highly dollarized FSU countries, the correlation drops to 
.657. The temporal correlations between CDI and DI within countries are consistently high 
for the CEE countries, but highly variable among the FSU countries, ranging from .222 for 
Russia .997 for Belarus.  
In section III, I construct temporal indices of currency substitution (CSI) and asset 
substitution (ASI) for each of the transition countries. The currency substitution index (CSI) 
is defined as the fraction of a nation’s total effective currency supply (local plus foreign 
currency in circulation) that is comprised of foreign currency. The asset substitution index 
(ASI) is defined as the ratio of foreign currency deposits (FCD) to total domestic deposits. 
The magnitudes and temporal trends of the estimated CSI and ASI are then examined for 
different countries over time
3 and space. Although currency substitution and asset 
substitution might be thought to be highly positively correlated over time, dominated by an 
income effect, it appears that for some countries, the substitution effect dominates, leading to 
a negative correlation between CSI and ASI measures.  Indeed, the relationship between 
currency substitution and asset substitution appears to be much more complex and varied 
than is usually thought to be the case, requiring more detailed country analysis to fully 
understand the relationship between the two phenomena. The main purpose of this exercise is 
to provide the empirical underpinnings for subsequent substantive analyses of the causes and 
consequences of the dollarization phenomenon and to more fully understand the motives and 
the implications of currency and asset substitution in both a temporal and cross section 
context.  
                                                                                                                                                        
2 The currencies reported in the surveys of the Austrian National Bank include Austrian schillings (AST), 
Deutsch marks (DM) and Swiss Francs (SW) in addition to US dollar (US) holdings. 
3 These temporal estimates of FCC have been employed by Feige, et al. (2002b) to analyze the consequences of 
network externalities and the hysteresis problem for the case of Argentina, and in the study by Oomes and 
Shikevich (2002) for Russia. 
  5  Interestingly, although the currency and asset substitution processes are both 
believed to be driven by similar forces (i.e. instability), we find that empirically, they need 
not move hand in hand, and may therefore, be driven by different incentive mechanisms.  
This finding is reinforced when the dollarization indices are related to currency and asset 
substitution indices. The final section contains a summary of our findings and conclusions as 
well as suggestions for further extensions of this work, particularly into the domain of 
monetary estimates of the unrecorded economies of transition countries. 
To anticipate some of our key findings, we observe that for the CEE countries, the 
extent of understatement of the DI is only a few percentage points on average, whereas for 
some of the FSU countries, the DI understates the CDI by as much as twenty-forty 
percentage points. Our CDI measure suggests that many of the transition countries are so 
highly dollarized that network externalities are likely to make the dollarization process very 
costly to reverse.
4  We find that in 2001, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia 
exhibit the highest degree of de facto dollarization of the FSU countries with more than 70 
percent of their effective broad money supply held in the form of foreign denominated assets 
(currency plus deposits). For the CEE countries, only Croatia, Macedonia and Romania have 
comprehensive dollarization ratios in excess of 50%. The lowest de facto dollarization 
(CDI<20%) is found in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. 
 
I. Measurement of Foreign Currency in Circulation in Transition Countries 
A: Direct measurement of dollars held abroad. 
There is now a growing body of evidence (Feige 1994, 1996, 1997; Porter and Judson 
1996) suggesting that between 40-60% of US cash is held abroad. The “official” estimate 
now published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal Reserve Board of 
  6Governors (FED) is based on a variant of a proxy measure proposed by Feige, (1994).  The 
official estimate indicates that in 2001, 50% of the $580 billion of US currency in circulation 
was held abroad. These aggregate measures indicate the amount of US currency held abroad 
is substantial, but they are incapable of determining the location of that currency. 
US currency has many desirable properties. It has a reputation as a stable currency, 
and is therefore a reliable store of value. It is available in many countries, is widely accepted 
as a medium of exchange, and protects foreign users against the threat of domestic bank 
failures, devaluation and inflation. Cash usage preserves anonymity because it leaves no 
paper trail of the transaction for which it serves as the means of payment and is therefore the 
preferred medium of exchange in underground transactions. Indeed the very characteristics 
that make the US dollar a popular medium of exchange also makes it difficult to determine 
the exact amount and location of US notes circulating abroad. Nevertheless, there is a direct 
source of information that can be used to determine the approximate amounts of US cash in 
circulation in different countries. 
Over the past two decades, the United States Customs Service has been mandated to 
collect systematic information on cross border flows of US currency. The Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (also known as the "Bank Secrecy Act") requires persons 
or institutions importing or exporting currency or other monetary instruments in amounts 
exceeding $10,000 to file a Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary 
Instruments (CMIR).  The information contained in the millions of accumulated confidential 
individual CMIR forms has been aggregated in order fully to preserve the confidentiality of 
individual filers’ information. The aggregated data yield time series observations on the gross 
inflows and outflows of US currency to and from different destinations.
5 By cumulating the 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Feige, et al. (2002b) estimate that for Argentina, a shift from high dollarization equilibrium to low level 
dollarization equilibrium would require a sustained 35% appreciation of the currency.   
5 A more detailed description of these data can be found in Feige, (1996, 1997). 
  7recorded net outflows of US dollars to all destinations, Feige and Dean (2002) presented 
initial unadjusted estimates of the amount of US currency held abroad as well as the location 
of US currency in various transition countries for 1999.  
The Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts and the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
employ a proxy measure of currency inflows and outflows to determine the aggregate net 
amounts of currency held abroad for balance of payments purposes. The proxy inflow 
measure is based on the total amount of $100 bills received from circulation each month in 
the New York and Los Angeles Federal Reserve banks. Similarly, the gross outflows of US 
dollars abroad are proxied by the total amount of $100 notes put into circulation each month 
by these two Federal Reserve offices. The proxy was chosen (Feige, 1994) because of its high 
correlation with the confidential estimates of net flows abroad calculated by the New York 
Federal Reserve.
6 However the proxy suffers from several obvious defects (Feige, 1997). 
First the proxy will overstate net outflows because some fraction of net injections of $100 
bills from these Federal Reserve banks are used to satisfy domestic demand. It will understate 
net outflows because it takes no account of smaller denomination notes shipped abroad and 
finally it takes no account of net shipments abroad from other Federal Reserve banks. 
Nevertheless, because the proxy represents the official US government estimate we compare 
below the gross outflows and gross inflows of currency based on the proxy measure and the 
corresponding estimates of these flows based on aggregate CMIR data.  
Figure 1 reveals that in the years prior to 1995, the CMIR estimates [CTI*] (adjusted 
for direct Federal Reserve receipts from abroad that are not required to be reported on CMIR 
forms) recorded a higher amount of US currency inflows to the US than the official proxy 
series. However, after 1996, the proxy estimates of inflows actually exceed those captured by 
CMIR data. 
  8A similar pattern is observed when the two alternative estimates of gross outflows of 
US currency are compared. Figure 2 reveals that the two series diverge significantly in the 
post 1996 period. One explanation of these anomalous results may be an unintended 
consequence of the introduction of the Extended Custodial Inventory (ECI) program by the 
Federal Reserve.  
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  9The Federal Reserve established the ECI program, as a means of assuring an adequate 
supply and rapid dissemination of newly designed US bank notes. It also served to expedite 
the repatriation of old-design notes from abroad in order to eliminate from circulation older 
notes that were more likely to be targets of counterfeiting.  The cost efficient means of 
achieving these goals required the Federal Reserve to strategically stockpile newly designed 
notes at ECI sites in Europe and repatriate old-design notes to the same ECI facilities. The 
ECI’s also served to subsequently re-circulate new-design fit notes to the international 
currency market. The establishment of the cost efficient ECI system, however, appears to 
have introduced a downward reporting bias in the CMIR estimates of currency held abroad, 
requiring a change in CMIR reporting practices to specifically include shipments and receipts 
of currency dispersed and collected from the FED’s ECI facilities overseas.  Notes sent to and 
returned from ECI facilities from the US are captured by CMIR reporting, however the final 
destination of subsequent re-shipments and receipts of these notes to foreign demanders are 
not properly captured in the CMIR reports because these notes are already reported as being 
overseas.  
As such, the establishment of the ECI and the oversight of not accommodating the 
CMIR reporting requirement to the new institutional setting results in an understatement of 
outflow and inflow data in the CMIR reports for the year 1996 and beyond. Since the aim is 
to capture all net outflows of US currency to final destinations in transition countries, the data 
have been adjusted to reflect the effects of net outflows of currency from ECI to transition 
countries in the post ECI period. 
B) Survey Estimates of European legacy currencies held abroad. 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence to suggest that in addition to dollars, CEE 
countries also employed legacy currencies of some European nations as co-circulating 
currencies. Unfortunately CMIR type data are not available for legacy currencies or for the 
  10euro.
7 Residents of several transition countries are however known to have held various 
amounts of German currency (DM), Austrian schillings (AST) and the Swiss Francs (SF).  
Earlier studies by Seitz (1995) and Doyle (2000) found that between 35-70% of Deutsch-
Marks (DM) were held outside of Germany. 
In anticipation of the euro conversion, the Austrian National Bank (ONB) 
commissioned Gallup to conduct a series of surveys in several CEE countries in order to 
determine the extent of FCC holdings of various legacy currencies. Each of the ten surveys 
conducted between June 1997 and November 2001 involved approximately 1000 persons 
above the age of 14.
8 Survey results concerning self-admitted currency holdings are best 
considered as lower bound estimates of actual currency holdings since such surveys are 
known to suffer from considerable underreporting bias. For example, the Federal Reserve 
Survey of Currency Usage (SCU) reveals that US household admit to holding less than 10% 
of the nation’s total currency supply in circulation outside of banks. Official estimates of US 
dollar holdings abroad suggest that roughly 50% of US currency is held overseas.  Since 
firms hold a negligible amount of cash, the Federal Reserve’s currency survey results indicate 
that such survey data require a blow-up factor of five in order to obtain a true estimate of 
actual domestic currency holdings.
9 Moreover, repeated SCU surveys show a relatively stable 
temporal pattern of underreporting bias. The Austrian Bank survey estimates are also likely to 
                                                 
7 A proposal to the European Central Bank to carefully monitor the historic introduction of the Euro by setting 
up an ECI type program that would record the gross outflows and inflows of euros and returning legacy 
currencies from outside the EMU was ultimately rejected by the ECB. However, with the support of the IMF 
and the Croatian National Bank, a number of CEE central banks have undertaken independent efforts to survey 
their commercial banks in an effort to collect data on the amounts of euros in circulation.  
8 The author is indebted to the Austrian National Bank for providing its survey estimates. 
9 The appropriateness of this fivefold adjustment is confirmed by independent estimates of the amount of FCC 
in circulation in Croatia. The Croatian National Bank monitored flows of foreign currency into and out of the 
banking system during and after the Euro conversion process and estimated that the holdings of FCC in Euros 
was 3.1 billion (Kraft, 2002). A fivefold blow-up of the Austrian National Bank (ONB) survey estimate of non-
dollar FCC holdings in Croatia yields a corresponding estimate 3.05 billion. These estimates are also within the 
range of indirect estimates of FCC in Croatia based on money demand and denomination displacement methods 
(Feige, et al., 2002a). Since Croatia is the only country for which the appropriateness of the blow-up factor 
could be independently tested, we employ the actual survey results without the blow-up factor for all CEE 
countries covered by the ONB survey.  
  11be subject to an underreporting bias, however, the precise magnitude of the bias is unknown. 
I therefore employ the ONB estimates without further adjustment since the primary concern 
of this paper is with the dynamic temporal development of FCC holdings rather than with 
their absolute level. As long as the degree of bias is relatively constant over time, it will not 
affect dynamic inferences. The estimated amounts of legacy currencies held in the surveyed 
CEE countries reflect the actual yearly average holdings obtained by the Austrian surveys.  
An added contribution of the ONB surveys is that they provide information on the 
currency composition of FCC holdings. Table 1 reveals that in each of the five countries  
Table 1: Percentage Distribution of FCC Holdings by Currency 
                                    Currency 
Country  AST DM SF  US 
Croatia  3 76  3  18 
Czech Republic  12 44  7  37 
Hungary  22 46  2  30 
Slovenia  11 71  3  14 
Slovak Republic  10 31  27  31 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Austrian Central Bank Survey data-Average values 1997-2001 
 
surveyed, the DM comprises the largest component of FCC holdings, followed by the US 
dollar. The consensus estimate of DM held outside of Germany is roughly the equivalent of 
$50 billion.  Using the ONB survey estimates of total DM held in the five countries implies 
that these countries collectively accounted for roughly 23 percent of the DM believed held 
outside of Germany.  The Czech Republic appears to hold almost 10% of estimated DM 
abroad, followed by Croatia with 6%.  
C: Estimates of Foreign Currency in Circulation in Transition Countries. 
The combined estimates of US dollar and legacy currency holdings are reported in Table 2, 
which displays estimates of the per capita FCC holdings in transition countries in 2001.
10   
                                                                                                                                                        
 
10 The data reported for Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic include both 
dollar holdings and the holdings of European legacy currencies as estimated from survey data obtained from the 
Austrian Central Bank. These are the only countries for which independent estimates of European legacy 
  12Table 2: Estimates of Per Capita Foreign Currency Holdings in Transition Countries 
  Per Capita 
Country FCC 
Percent of total 
currency held as 
foreign currency 
  2001 2001 



























Sources: Authors Calculations based on: * CMIR (adjusted); **Austrian National Bank 
Survey data. 
 
We find that FCC holdings of US dollars in transition countries accounted for roughly 29 
percent of the $580 billion of US currency in circulation with the public in the year 2001. 
The second column of the table reports the percentage of total currency (FCC+LCC) 
estimated held in the form of foreign currency. The highest percentage of FCC holdings are 
found in Kazakhstan, with Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Latvia all having more than 70 
                                                                                                                                                        
currencies are available. The results reported for all other countries therefore include only estimated holdings of 
US dollars.  
11 The FCC estimates based on the Austrian Central Bank survey data are likely to underestimate total FCC 
holdings. For example, Kraft (2002) estimates that Croatia’s FCC holdings in 2001 were approximately $3.1 
billion or roughly $665 per capita. This would raise the estimate of the percent of FCC in total currency to 75. 
  13percent of their total currency supply held in the form of FCC. Both the high per capita 
holdings and the high percent of total currency held in Latvia is a surprise, and may reflect 
currency shipped to Latvia that was subsequently transferred to other FSU countries. In 
particular, the estimates for Belarus seem very low when compared to an informal treasury 
department estimate (US Treasury, 2000) suggesting per capita dollar holdings of some $300 
dollars. Given the proximity of the two countries, it is likely that a considerable portion of 
Latvia’s net dollar inflows is subsequently transshipped to Belarus. Similar cross border 
shipment effects could affect other countries as well. 
   
II. Dollarization Measures: A Comparison of Alternative Dollarization Indices. 
A. Measures, Magnitudes and Trends 
Given the estimates of FCC holdings displayed in Table 2 it is now possible to 
examine the consequences of employing alternative measures of unofficial dollarization. 
Feige et. al. (2002a and 2002b) point out that in an economy with unofficial dollarization, the 
effective broad M2 money supply consists of local cash in circulation outside the banking 
system (LCC), foreign cash in circulation outside the banking system (FCC), local demand 
deposits (LDD), local currency time and savings deposits (LTD) and foreign currency 
deposits (FCD) held with domestic banks. Quasi money (QM) is defined as LTD and FCD. 
The typical definition of broad money therefore falls short of the effective broad money 
supply by the unknown amount of FCC. The narrow M1 money supply is typically defined to 
include only LCC and LDD. However in a dollarized economy, the effective narrow money 
supply (EM1) should also include FCC.  
Unofficial (de facto) dollarization or euroization takes place when individuals and 
firms voluntarily choose to use foreign currency as either a transaction substitute (currency 
substitution) or a store of value substitute (asset substitution) for the monetary services of 
  14domestic currency. In a regime with de facto dollarization, the recorded money supply falls 
short of the effective money supply due to the omission FCC, which is typically unknown 
and not directly controllable by the local central bank. Due to the previous lack of data on 
foreign currency in circulation (FCC), research on the de facto dollarization process has been 
forced to accept the observable amount of foreign currency deposits (FCD) as a proxy for 
dollarization. Studies of dollarization and currency substitution, often associated with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), employ the ratio of FCD to broad money (FCD/M2) as 
the measure of the extent to which countries are dollarized. We denote this traditional 
dollarization index (DI) where: 
1) (DI) ≡ (FCD/M2) 
De facto dollarization is often a response to hyperinflation, currency devaluations or a 
history of bank confiscations. Under such circumstances, a foreign currency may first serve 
as a unit of account and store of value and only later as a circulating medium of exchange. 
Asset substitution refers to a foreign currency serving as a store of value, whereas currency 
substitution occurs when the foreign currency also serves as a medium of exchange. When 
both asset substitution and currency substitution take place, or when FCD’s are used by firms 
to make transactions with international partners, we define a comprehensive dollarization 
index (CDI) that represents the fraction of a nation’s broad effective money supply composed 
of foreign monetary assets. Thus: 
(2) CDI ≡ (FCC+FCD)/ (M2+FCC) 
The extent of de facto dollarization depends upon various incentives to hold the 
different assets described in the denominators and numerators of the dollarization indices. 
These incentives include relative rates of return as reflected in interest rate differentials, 
inflation differentials, and exchange rate depreciation, as well as the relative benefits and 
costs associated with network externalities and switching costs. The traditional dollarization 
  15index (DI) will be an adequate proxy of de facto dollarization when foreign currency 
holdings are of marginal importance, or when FCC and FCD are highly complementary. If, 
however, significant amounts of foreign currency circulate for transaction purposes, or if 
FCC and FCD are in fact substitutes, the traditional dollarization measure performs poorly as 
an indicator of de facto dollarization. The DI index understates the true extent of 
dollarization due to its omission of FCC holdings.  
Table 3a Alternative Measures of De Facto Dollarization in FSU Countries*  
         
The Baltics  CDI  DI  CDI Trend  DI Trend 
Estonia 33.7 17.2 ↑↑  
Latvia 67.5 30.0 ↑→  
Lithuania 34.7 32.9 ↑↑  
MEAN FOR GROUP:  45.3 26.7  
Western FSU             
Belarus 57.2 52.8 ↑↑  
Moldova 27.3 27.3 ↑↑  
Russia 73.5 24.5 ↑↑  
Ukraine 37.8 19.4 ↑↑  
MEAN FOR GROUP:  56.2 31.0  
The Caucasus            
Armenia 68.1 46.5 ↑↑  
Azerbaijan 82.3 48.8 ↑↑  
Georgia 80.2 44.5 ↑↑  
MEAN FOR GROUP:  76.9 46.6  
Central Asia            
Kazakhstan 89.7 47.5 ↑↑  
Kyrgyz Republic  52.3 25.2 ↑↑  
Tajikistan 29.5 29.5 ↑↑  
Turkmenistan 54.4 39.9 ↑↑  
Uzbekistan 40.7 24.4 ↑↑  
MEAN FOR GROUP:  59.2 33.3  
MEAN FOR FSU:  59.5 33.2  
*The data employed to derive these estimates include the following sources: Various Central Bank 
Annual reports, the IMF International Financial Statistics (2002) and the internal IMF European II database 
kindly provided by Oleh Havrylyshyn. Unfortunately, for some countries, the internal IMF data and the 
published IFS data are discrepant. In these cases we have used the definitional relationships between monetary 
aggregates to derive our best estimate of the components of the dollarization indices reported. The CDI and DI 
trends are based on the period 1997-2001. 
  16 
Table 3a and 3b display a country-by-country comparison of the comprehensive 
dollarization proxy (CDI) that takes explicit account of the estimated amount of FCC in 
circulation in each nation with the traditional dollarization index (DI). The tables also display 
the trends in dollarization as revealed by each index. 
 
Table 3b: Alternative Measures of De Facto Dollarization in EU Border  Countries 
 
EU Border 
Countries  CDI  DI  CDI Trend  DI Trend 
Croatia* 69.2 67.9 ↑↑  
Czech Republic  13.7 11.1 ↓→  
Hungary  17.1 16.3 ↓↓  
Poland 19.0 15.6 ↓↓  
Slovak Republic  19.4 15.6 ↑↑  
Slovenia  39.1 35.3 ↑↑  
MEAN FOR GROUP:  29.6 27.0  
The Balkans            
Albania 26.2 22.4 ↑↑  
Bulgaria 48.5 39.2 ↓→  
Macedonia 58.6 58.1 ↑↑  
Romania 50.7 42.8 ↑↑  
MEAN FOR GROUP:  46.0 40.6  
MEAN FOR CEE:  36.2 32.4  
* Inter-temporal estimates of FCC derived from Šošić and Faulend (2002). Countries whose names appear in 
italics include both European legacy currency and dollar holdings. 
 
Balino et al (1999) classify countries as “highly dollarized” if their DI is greater than 
30 percent. According to this classification criterion, the following eight FSU countries are 
highly dollarized: Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkmenistan, 
Lithuania and Latvia. The CDI index includes all of these countries (except Lithuania) 
among the eight most dollarized countries.  Notably the CDI index identifies Russia as the 
fourth most highly dollarized FSU country. For the CEE countries, the “highly dollarized” 
  17countries would include, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia, and these 
same five countries are selected as the most highly dollarized by the CDI index. For regions, 
both indices indicate that for the FSU, the highest degree of dollarization is found in the 
Caucasus region while the lowest dollarization has occurred in the Baltic States. Similarly, 
for the CEE countries, both indices suggest higher levels of dollarization in the Balkans than 
in the EU border countries.  
Examining the five-year trend in dollarization over the period 1997-2001, the CDI 
indicates increasing dollarization for all of the FSU countries. The DI shows similar trends 
except for Latvia, whose dollarization trend appears stable over the period.  For the CEE 
countries, both indices suggest growing dollarization in Croatia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Albania, Macedonia and Romania. 
In short, all of these countries display hysteresis effects, in which the lack of 
confidence in domestic monetary assets resulting from past inflations, devaluations and bank 
confiscations appears difficult to reverse, even when macroeconomic conditions stabilize. To 
the extent that the dollarization involves currency substitution, Feige et al. (2002a) and 
Oomes and Shinkevich (2002) have shown that network externalities in the use of foreign 
currency will also make dollarization difficult to reverse.  The only countries that exhibit 
falling or stable dollarization trends are Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic also had the lowest levels of dollarization and 
therefore may well have been below the threshold where network externalities in the use of 
FCC become significant. The downward trend observed in Bulgaria, which has a relatively 
high level of dollarization may be explicable in terms of a gradual substitution of dollars by 
other European currencies that could not be included in the FCC measure.  
 
B. Cross County and Inter-temporal Relationships 
  18We now turn to an examination of the consistency between the CDI and DI measures 
of dollarization for the transition countries. One simple measure of consistency is the 
correlation between the two indices across countries.  For all of the transition countries in our 
sample we find the correlation to be .734. For the CEE countries alone it rises to .988, but for 
the FSU countries the correlation drops to .657, suggesting that the omission of the large 
dollar holdings in the FSU may produce a severe understatement of the extent of 
dollarization when the traditional DI measure is used rather than the CDI.  
 Table 4a: FSU Inter-Temporal Correlations between CDI and DI 
  CDI-DI  Period 
Estonia 0.912  93-2001 
Latvia 0.804  93-2001 
Lithuania 0.923 93-2001 
Belarus 0.997  92-2002 
Russia 0.222  93-2001 
Ukraine 0.596  92-2001 
Armenia 0.928  92-2001 
Azerbaijan 0.415  94-2001 
Georgia 0.981  95-2001 
Kazakhstan 0.363  94-2001 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.929  93-2001 
Turkmenistan 0.959  94-2001 
Uzbekistan 0.864  92-2001 
 
Table 4b: CEE Inter-Temporal Correlations Between CDI and DI 
  CDI-DI   
Croatia 0.997  93-2000 
Czech Republic  0.972  93-2001 
Hungary 0.985  90-2001 
Poland 0.969  90-2001 
Slovak Republic  0.950  97-2001 
Slovenia 0.960  97-2001 
Albania 0.736  92-2001 
Bulgaria 0.971  91-2001 
Macedonia 0.999  95-2001 
Romania 0.994  90-2001 
 
  19An examination of the inter-temporal correlations for each separate county allows a more 
detailed examination of the problem. As displayed in Table 4b, the inter-temporal correlation 
between the CDI and DI indicators exceeds .95 for all countries except Albania. However, in 
the FSU group (Table 4a), the inter-temporal correlations show considerable variations 
between countries. The correlations between the two indices are particularly low for Russia 
(.222), Kazakhstan (.317) Azerbaijan (.415) and the Ukraine (.596). These differences may 
be highly significant when researchers address the positive issues of the nature, causes and 
consequences of de facto dollarization, which require an accurate dollarization indicator. The 
coherence and proper interpretation of the two de facto dollarization indicators will depend 
upon the extent to which different countries experience different degrees of currency and 
asset substitution. It is to this issue that we now turn. 
III.  Currency and Asset Substitution. 
A. Measures, Magnitudes and Trends 
Currency substitution occurs when a foreign currency largely displaces the domestic 
currency as the medium of exchange. Feige et al. (2002a, 2002b) suggest an explicit measure 
of the extent of currency substitution that they call the currency substitution index (CSI). It 
shows the fraction of a nation’s total currency supply held in the form of foreign currency.
12 
Thus,  
(3) CSI ≡ FCC/ (FCC+LCC). 
When dollarization primarily involves the use of foreign denominated monetary assets as 
substitutes for domestic ones in their capacity as stores of value, it is useful to define an asset 
                                                 
12 Some foreign banknotes may be hoarded for long periods and might therefore be considered largely as a store 
of value. When the fraction of FCC that is in long term hoards can be estimated, it should be treated as a store of 
value and included in the asset substitution index rather than the currency substitution index.  
 
  20substitution index (ASI) as the ratio of foreign denominated monetary assets to domestic 
denominated monetary assets excluding currency outside banks.
13 
(4) ASI ≡ FCD/(LDD+LTD)= FCD/(M2-LCC-FCD)  
Since the motives for currency substitution and its implications can be quite different from 
those of asset substitution, we now turn to an examination of currency and asset substitution 
indices for the transition countries.  
Table 5a: Currency and Asset Substitution in FSU Countries 
The Baltics  CSI  ASI  CSI Trend  ASI Trend 
Estonia 59 26 ↑  → 
Latvia 79 76 ↑  ↓ 
Lithuania 11 75 →  ↑ 
MEAN FOR GROUP:  50 59   
Western FSU            
Belarus 34 194 ↑  ↑ 
Moldova NA 78 NA  ↑ 
Russia 87 51 ↑  ↑ 
Ukraine 64 50 ↑  ↑ 
MEAN FOR GROUP:  62 93  
The Caucasus            
Armenia 62 377 ↑  ↑ 
Azerbaijan 82 578 ↑  ↑ 
Georgia 79 543 ↑  ↑ 
MEAN FOR GROUP:  74 499  
Central Asia            
Kazakhstan 95 164 ↑  ↑ 
Kyrgyz Republic  48 181 ↑  ↑ 
Tajikistan NA 160 NA  ↑ 
Turkmenistan 51 137 ↑  ↑ 
Uzbekistan 44 60 ↑  ↑ 
MEAN FOR GROUP:  59 140  
MEAN FOR FSU: 61 183  
 
                                                 
13 When data on M2 and/or LTD are unavailable, but measures of QM are available, the asset substitution index 
can be approximated by the ratio of FCD to total deposits, which equals LDD+QM. These two measures tend to 
be closely correlated. However, just as some FCC is used for hoards, some portion of FCD may be used for 
  21Tables 5a and 5b, respectively display estimates of the currency and asset substitution 
indices for the FSU and CEE countries for the year 2001 as well as the five year inter-
temporal trend of each index for each country for which data are available. Table 5a reveals 
that the CSI, representing the fraction of the total currency supply made up of US dollars, 
exceeds 50 percent for Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Latvia, Ukraine, Armenia, 
Estonia and Turkmenistan.  These are countries in which the use of foreign currencies is so 
widespread, that seniorage losses are substantial. The extensive use of foreign currencies in 
response to inflationary and financial instability incentives result in network externalities in 
foreign currency usage which may now exceed the threshold level (Feige et al. (2002b) at 
which it is unlikely that the use of FCC will be reversed. The surprisingly high and rising 
demand for dollars in both Latvia and Estonia may be due to continued trade with other FSU 
countries that also use dollars as a primary medium of exchange. Moreover, the more than 
20% decline in the euro/dollar exchange rate after the initial launch of the euro provided an 
incentive for firms and individuals to maintain dollar denominated monetary assets.  Every 
country, with the exception of Lithuania, displayed increasing degrees of currency 
substitution during the period 1997-2001. On a regional basis, both currency substitution and 
asset substitution are highest in the Caucasus region and lowest in the Baltic States. 
Table 5a also reveals the Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan display the highest degrees of asset substitution of the FSU 
countries. The trend of asset substitution over the period 1997-2001 has been increasing for 
all countries with the exception of Lithuania, where asset substitution has been relatively 
stable, and Latvia, where asset substitution has actually decreased.  
                                                                                                                                                        
transactions purposes. Where this transaction component can be determined, the appropriate empirical treatment 
would be to include it in the currency substitution index rather than the asset substitution index.  
  22Table 5b displays currency and asset substitution indices and trends for the CEE 
countries. Only Romania and Slovenia have more than 50 percent of their total currency 
supply in the form of FCC. For these countries, it seems realistic to infer that the marginal  
Table 5b: Currency and Asset Substitution in CEE Countries: 
EU Border 
Countries  CSI  ASI  CSI Trend  ASI Trend 
Croatia  46 283 ↓  ↑ 
Czech Republic  21 14 ↓  → 
Hungary  62 4 ↓  ↓ 
Poland 27 21 ↓  ↓ 
Slovak Republic  28 22 ↓  ↑ 
Slovenia  54 59 ↑  ↑ 
MEAN FOR GROUP:  26 64  
The Balkans            
Albania 14 47 →  ↑ 
Bulgaria 41 111 ↓  ↑ 
Macedonia 5 315 ↑  ↑ 
Romania 55 97 ↑  ↑ 
MEAN FOR GROUP:  29 143  
MEAN FOR CEE:  29 99  
Countries whose names appear in italics include both European legacy and dollar holdings. 
costs of shifting from one foreign currency into another (i.e. from dollars into euros) are 
lower than the marginal costs of shifting from foreign to domestic currencies. Hence, those 
countries that have partially dollarized are more likely to move toward euros than back to 
local currencies since the relative benefits attached to euros as opposed to dollars – at least 
for transactions purposes – will rise as contiguous and nearby countries euroize. The existing 
domestic network externality effect is likely to be supplemented by a neighborhood network 
externality effect as official euroization spreads eastward. Thus, over time, incentives will 
rise for these CEE countries to move unilaterally from unofficial partial dollarization to 
official, exclusive euroization. 
Hungary, Macedonia and Albania appear to have unusually low degrees of currency 
substitution, however, it must be recalled that FCC estimates for these countries do not 
  23include euro holdings, which may be considerable, particularly for Macedonia. Even 
accounting for this likely underestimation of total FCC holdings, it is striking that overall, the 
CEE countries have a mean CSI of 27 percent compared to the FSU mean of 61 percent. 
Moreover, six of the ten CEE countries display a declining five-year trend in the currency 
substitution index whereas all of the FSU countries save Lithuania display and increasing 
trend in currency substitution. This is consistent with the hypothesis that at lower levels of 
currency substitution there are smaller gains from network externalities and hence higher 
transactions costs in the use of FCC. Under such circumstances, improving domestic 
macroeconomic conditions and more stable expectations patterns can give rise to a reversal in 
the currency substitution process. In Bulgaria, this may also be a response to increased 
credibility achieved by the establishment of a Currency Board. 
Macedonia, Croatia and Bulgaria display the highest degrees of asset substitution as 
well as increasing trends over time. The lowest degrees of asset substitution is found in the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic and Hungary with all but the Slovak Republic 
displaying stable or declining asset substitution over time. Overall, the CEE countries exhibit 
a much lower degree of asset substitution than the FSU countries as exhibited by the means 
for country groupings. The mean ASI for the CEE countries is 96 compared to a mean for the 
FSU countries of 183. 
B. The Relationship between Currency and Asset Substitution 
We now turn to the important question of the relationship between currency 
substitution and asset substitution. In principle, the two processes need not go hand in hand 
given the differences between transactions and asset motives for holding foreign currencies.  
Table 6 displays the cross-country correlations between our key measures of currency 
substitution (CSI), asset substitution (ASI) and the two measures of overall dollarization CDI 
  24and DI.
14 Column two reveals that for all of the transition countries in our sample, the 
correlation between currency substitution and asset substitution is positive as expected, but 
remarkably low (.355) The FSU countries score a correlation of only .312 whereas for the 
CEE countries, the relationship between currency and asset substitution drops virtually to 
zero.   
Table 6- Cross Country Correlations – Currency and Asset Substitution Indices 
Region  CSI-ASI  CSI-CDI  CSI-DI  ASI-CDI  ASI-DI 
FSU*  0.312 0.763 0.113 0.628 0.692
CEE  0.021 0.431 0.347 0.886 0.932
FSU*+CEE  0.355 0.748 0.218 0.711 0.695
*Excluding Tajikistan and Moldova 
These findings have important implications for both the interpretation and the relative 
reliability of the comprehensive dollarization index (CDI) as compared to the traditional 
dollarization index (DI). Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 reveal that the CDI is significantly more 
correlated with currency substitution than is the DI, whereas columns 5 and 6 indicate that 
both dollarization indices reflect measures of asst substitution to roughly the same degree.  
A more detailed analysis of these relationships can be found in Tables 7a and 7b. 
Column 2 reveals that the inter-temporal relationship between currency substitution and asset 
substitution are indeed much more varied and complex than is usually thought to be the case.  
For many of the countries, currency substitution and asset substitution appear to be positively 
correlated over time, but the degree of this positive correlation ranges from a low of .078 for 
Azerbaijan, to more than .90 for Macedonia, the Czech Republic and Georgia. Moreover, five 
of the transition countries exhibit a temporal pattern in which increases in asset substitution 
are associated with declines in currency substitution. This is of course possible when rising 
confidence in the domestic banking system and improvements in its provision of transactions 
services induces a shift from FCC to domestic monetary deposits. One important set of 
                                                 
14 This analysis is contingent on the caveats mentioned in footnotes 12 and 13.  
  25factors that will affect the choice of FCC but not that of bank deposits, are the incentives that 
drive individuals into the underground economy. Where the incentives for underground 
activity are growing at the same time that banking systems are improving, we could observe 
an increase in FCC holdings (and hence a rise in CSI) even as individuals shift from FCD 
into domestic monetary assets (hence a decrease in ASI). In short, the complex relationship 
between asset substitution and currency substitution requires careful dynamic country-by-
country analysis, an undertaking made possible by the newly developed estimates of CSI. 
Table 7a:  Inter-temporal Currency and Asset Substitution Correlations - FSU  
  CSI-ASI  CSI-CDI  CSI-DI  ASI-CDI  ASI-DI 
Estonia 0.249 0.888 0.454 0.666  0.971
Latvia 0.580 0.991 0.793 0.672  0.728
Lithuania -0.162 0.323 -0.066 0.856  0.962
Belarus 0.540 0.455 0.391 0.961  0.952
Russia -0.039 0.929 -0.096 0.279  0.988
Ukraine 0.534 0.938 0.275 0.783  0.942
Armenia 0.635 0.816 0.547 0.901  0.904
Azerbaijan 0.078 0.739 -0.269 0.560  0.853
Georgia 0.934 0.994 0.955 0.948  0.968
Kazakhstan 0.346 0.984 0.275 0.429  0.983
Kyrgyz Republic  0.832 0.970 0.816 0.921  0.930
Turkmenistan 0.835 0.957 0.863 0.931  0.918
Uzbekistan 0.564 0.829 0.438 0.925  0.980
 
Table 7b:  Inter-temporal Currency and Asset Substitution Correlations - CEE 
  CSI-ASI  CSI-CDI  CSI-DI  ASI-CDI  ASI-DI 
Croatia 0.158 0.452 0.141 0.947  0.988
Czech Republic  0.915 0.974 0.905 0.999  0.999
Hungary 0.160 0.485 0.325 0.933  0.977
Poland -0.658 -0.452 -0.581 0.930  0.966
Slovak Republic  -0.786 -0.525 -0.759 0.938  0.999
Slovenia 0.532 0.776 0.567 0.947  0.999
Albania -0.494 0.411 -0.315 0.539  0.927
Bulgaria 0.784 0.893 0.814 0.962  0.941
Macedonia 0.973 0.969 0.968 0.985  0.985
Romania 0.882 0.894 0.840 0.992  0.985
 
  26  Table 7a and 7b also display the inter-temporal correlations for each country between 
the CSI and ASI and the two dollarization measures. The CDI is positively related to the CSI 
for all countries except for Poland and the Slovak Republic whereas the relationship between 
CSI and DI is more variable and reveals six countries where currency substitution and 
dollarization are negatively related.  Asset substitution, on the other hand, is positively and 
strongly related to both dollarization indices. 
  We conclude that the relationship between asset substitution and currency substitution 
is both more varied and more complex than is usually thought to be the case, requiring a 
country-by-country analysis of the separate incentives for holding FCC as opposed to FCD 
and domestic deposits. We also find that both measures of dollarization capture the major 
consequences of asset substitution, but that the CDI clearly dominates the DI as a measure 
capturing the effects of currency substitution. We are left with the enigma that in some cases, 
currency substitution and asset substitution are actually negatively related over time. One 
provisional explanation of this phenomenon can be found in improvements in the domestic 
banking system that leads firms and individuals to convert foreign currency holdings into 
foreign currency bank deposits. Such a shift will simultaneously produce in a fall in CSI and 
a rise in ASI. Conversely, a decline of confidence in the domestic banking system can lead to 
a shift of bank deposits into FCC as well as a shift from domestic deposits into foreign 
currency deposits. Once again, this portfolio realignment can give rise to a negative 
relationship between CSI and ASI. 
  A suggestive, albeit preliminary investigation of this hypothesis can be undertaken by 
examining the cross-country correlation between our dollarization, currency substitution and 
asset substitution measures and the EBRD index of banking sector reform (BR) in the various 
transition countries. 
  27  Table 8 displays the cross-country correlations between our key indicators and the 
EBRD index of banking reform (BR). We find that improvements in banking reform are  
Table 8: Relationship Between CDI, DI. CSI, ASI and Banking Reform   
 
Correlations  CDI-BR  DI-BR  CSI-BR  ASI-BR 
 
FSU*+CEE -0.423 -0.276 -0.303 -0.260
*Excluding Tajikistan and Moldova 
negatively correlated with both dollarization measures, suggesting some shift in portfolios 
from foreign to domestic assets.  Moreover, improvements in banking sector reform are 
negatively correlated with indices of both currency and asset substitution.  The negative 
correlation with CSI suggests that domestic banking sector reform can lead to a shift from 
FCC to foreign denominated bank deposits. This finding is consistent with our observation of 
a negative relationship between CSI and ASI for some countries. The negative correlation 
between banking reform and ASI suggests that greater confidence in the banking sector may 
also induce a shift from FCD to domestic deposits. A complete analysis of this issue will 
require a dynamic analysis of the relationship between banking reforms and CSI and ASI 
over time for each country. 
 
IV. Summary and Conclusions 
Unofficial or de facto dollarization is the result of both currency substitution and asset 
substitution. Currency and asset substitution are typically induced by past inflations, 
devaluations, currency confiscations and the growth of underground economies. When de 
facto dollarization is widespread, the effective money supply is much larger than the 
domestic money supply and is, moreover, less easily controlled by the monetary authority 
because of the public’s propensity to substitute foreign for domestic currency. For example, 
de facto use of FCC will thwart government efforts to employ inflationary finance to impose 
implicit taxes on domestic monetary assets.  Extensive currency substitution not only makes 
  28domestic monetary policy less effective, it also makes active exchange rate interventions 
more dangerous. 
Currency substitution also has fiscal consequences that are particularly salient for 
transition countries. Foreign cash transactions reduce the costs of tax evasion and facilitate 
participation in the unreported or “underground” economy. This weakens the government’s 
ability to command real resources from the private sector and deepens fiscal deficits. The 
shifting of economic activity toward the underground economy distorts macroeconomic 
information systems (Feige, 1990, 1997), thereby adding to the difficulty of formulating 
macroeconomic policy. By obscuring financial transactions, currency substitution reduces the 
cost of enterprise theft and facilitates corruption and rent seeking. 
 In order to learn more about the extent, causes and consequences of the dollarization 
process, we present newly collected time series data on the amounts and locations of US 
dollars and some European legacy currencies held in transition countries These data enable 
us to circumvent the problem of “unobservability” that has plagued the currency substitution 
literature since its inception, permitting a refinement of definitions and measures of currency 
substitution, asset substitution, and the construction of a new comprehensive measure of de 
facto dollarization. Once foreign currency in circulation is measurable, it becomes possible to 
directly examine the causes and consequences of de facto dollarization, as well as the 
circumstances under which it is likely to become persistent, if not irreversible.  These issues 
are essentially dynamic in nature, requiring time series evidence on de facto dollarization, 
currency substitution and asset substitution. Employing such time series for Argentina and 
Russia, Feige et al. (2002a, 2002b) and Oomes and Shinkevich (2002) respectively find that 
hysteresis and irreversibility can be induced by network externalities associated with the use 
of foreign currency. When network externalities become sufficiently large, countries may 
decide to dollarize or euroize their economies, forgoing the seigniorage, and the flexibility of 
  29domestic monetary management in exchange for greater financial stability and an enhanced 
ability to attract foreign investment. 
Earlier measures of dollarization largely relied on foreign currency deposits as an 
indicator of currency substitution because actual measures of foreign currency in circulation 
were unavailable. Employing aggregated data derived from Currency and Monetary 
Instrument Reports, (adjusted for anomalies introduced by the Extended Custodial Inventory 
Program) on dollar inflows and outflows to and from the US, as well as estimates of other 
European currencies that co-circulate with local currencies, we estimate the total amounts of 
FCC in various transition countries. We find that total FCC holdings of US dollars in the 
included transition countries account for some 29 percent of the total amount of US currency 
believed to be held abroad. Our temporal estimates of the comprehensive dollarization index 
(CDI) suggests that there has been an upward five year trend in dollarization for all FSU 
countries, but a decline in dollarization is several of the CEE countries.    
Cross country and inter-temporal correlations reveal that our comprehensive 
dollarization index (CDI) is highly correlated with the traditional measure of dollarization 
(DI) for the CEE countries, but the relationship is less consistent for the FSU countries. The 
traditional (DI) that relies exclusively on measures of foreign currency deposits, is found to 
be indicative of asset substitution but perform poorly as measures of currency substitution. 
Our CDI dollarization indicator suggests that many of the transition countries have already 
surpassed threshold levels of currency substitution. When this occurs, network externalities 
are likely to make the dollarization process irreversible. We find that Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Russia, exhibit the highest degree of de facto dollarization with more than 70 
percent of their effective broad money supply held in the form of foreign denominated assets. 
Kraft (2002) addresses the difficulties faced by monetary policy makers in transition 
  30countries operating in environments where currency and asset substitution issues are 
paramount.  
The provision of data on FCC in circulation in transition countries permits the 
construction of more refined indicators of currency substitution (CSI) and asset substitution 
(ASI). Cross country and inter-temporal correlations reveal that the relationship between 
currency substitution and asset substitution is much more varied and complex than is usually 
thought to be the case. These findings suggest that future research should concentrate on the 
estimation of demand functions for both domestic and foreign monetary assets, taking 
account of the substitution possibilities between them as well as the influence of other key 
aspects of the transition process, including, but not limited to the progress of a countries 
banking reforms, and its record on macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization. 
Preliminary analysis suggests that bank reform is associated with lower levels of overall 
dollarization and its components, currency and asset substitution.  
 The provision of data on FCC holdings also lays the empirical foundations for the 
application of monetary methods for estimating the size and growth of underground 
economies in transition countries during the decade of transition. Monetary methods 
employing the domestic currency/deposit ratio have been employed in most countries for 
estimating unobserved (unrecorded) income, however the absence of data on the amount of 
FCC in circulation has led to significant biases in these estimates, and has largely precluded 
monetary estimates of unrecorded income growth in transition countries. To date, temporal 
estimates of unrecorded or unobserved economic activity [Kaufman, (1994); Kaufman and 
Kilberda, (1996); Johnson, et al. (1997) and Eilat and Zinnes (2000)] in transition countries 
have been based exclusively on variants of the electrical consumption method.  However, 
Feige, (2002d) has shown that these methods produce highly questionable results. As such, 
virtually the entire literature assessing the performance of transition countries during the past 
  31decade has been based on official estimates of GDP growth rather than on a more 
comprehensive measure of total economic activity, namely recorded plus unrecorded income 
growth. The availability of FCC estimates in transition countries permits the estimation of the 
effective currency deposit ratio [(FCC+LCC)/(LDD+LTD+FDC)] and hence the application 
of monetary methods to estimate unrecorded income growth. As shown by Feige, (2002d), 
the resulting estimates of total economic activity reveal a rather different picture of transition 
country performance, and hence require a reexamination of the factors implicated in both the 
observed success stories as well as the transition failures. In short, it is hoped that the 
availability of more comprehensive measures of dollarization and its currency and asset 
substitution components will lead to a deeper level of understanding of both the dynamics 
and implications of the dollarization process and the process of transition from planned to 
market economies. 
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